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FREE EXERCISE, FEDERALISM, AND THE
STATES AS LABORATORIES*
Daniel 0. Conkle**
Over the last decade, the United States Supreme Court and
Congress have been engaged in an ongoing struggle concerning the
free exercise of religion, the role of the Court and Congress in
defining its scope, and the relationship of this liberty to the
constitutional policy of federalism. In this brief article, I first will
summarize this struggle, which has left the issue of free exercise,
for now, largely in the hands of the states. I will then examine the
role of federalism in this context, and I will suggest that the
present state of devolution offers the opportunity for potentially
fruitful experimentation.
In its 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,' the
Supreme Court declared that generally applicable laws ordinarily
do not require special constitutional scrutiny under the Free
Exercise Clause and, as a result, may be freely applied to
religiously motivated conduct.2 Concluding that the Court's new
doctrine impaired religious liberty, Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").3 RFRA was
expressly designed to repudiate the Smith interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause and to "restore" the Court's pre-existing
constitutional doctrine for application to state as well as federal
laws.4 Invoking the "strict scrutiny" language of pre-Smith cases,5
RFRA stated that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability,"6  unless the government can
* Copyright 1999 by Daniel 0. Conkle.
** Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, and
Adjunct Professor of Religious Studies, Indiana University-Bloomington.
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See id. at 878-90.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
4 See id. § 2000bb (congressional findings and declaration of purposes).
5 Congress stated that RFRA was intended "to restore the compelling interest test as
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened." Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
6 Id. § 2000bb-l(a).
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"demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person-(1) is
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest."'
In my view, Congress was right to conclude that Smith
impaired religious liberty, but wrong to conclude that Congress
had the power to override the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution and to impose its own interpretation on the states.
On the latter point (but not the former), the Supreme Court
agreed in its 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.9 In Boerne,
the Court invalidated RFRA, at least as applied to state and local
laws, holding that the Act exceeded the power of Congress under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
In response to Boerne, Congress is considering new
legislation, the Religious Liberty Protection Act ("RLPA"), which
seeks to reimpose RFRA-like standards on state and local laws on
the basis of other theories and sources of congressional power.11
This new legislation, however, raises difficult constitutional
questions. Current Supreme Court doctrine, reflecting the trend
of recent decisions protecting constitutional federalism, suggests
that the power of Congress in this area is limited at best.12
The Court's embrace of federalism is controversial, both in
general and in the particular context of religious liberty.
Federalism serves a variety of potential purposes: protecting
liberty by dispersing governmental power; bringing government
closer to the people; permitting the law to be tailored to local
circumstances and local political preferences; and, in the words of
Justice Brandeis, permitting the states to serve as "laboratories"
7 Id. § 2000bb-l(b). There is a wealth of literature addressing RFRA and related
questions. See, e.g., Symposium, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
8 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional
Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39 (1995).
9 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10 See id. at 516-36. For symposia addressing Boerne and related issues, see 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555 (1998); Symposium, Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 597 (1998); Symposium, Does Religious Freedom Have a
Future?: The First Amendment After Boerne, 2 NEXUS: A JOURNAL OF OPINION 1 (1997).
11 RLPA was originally introduced in the 105th Congress. See H.R. 4019, 105th Cong.
(1998); S. 2148, 105th Cong. (1998). In revised form, it was reintroduced in the current
106th Congress and, as amended, it was passed by the House of Representatives on July
15, 1999. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REC. H5608 (daily ed. July 15,
1999). The legislation now awaits Senate action.
12 See Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v.
Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and
Local Infringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633 (1998).
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for experimentation.13 I do not believe that these potential
benefits of federalism outweigh the need for national protection
and enforcement of fundamental constitutional rights. Indeed, in
the context of religious liberty, my first preference would be for
the Supreme Court to overrule Smith and to develop a vigorous
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause-an interpretation that
would protect religious liberty throughout the nation. 4
For the present, however, it seems doubtful that the Supreme
Court will move in this direction. 5 Furthermore, as Boerne
suggests, the Court has shown little interest in permitting Congress
to do what the Court itself has not. Fbr better or worse, the scope
of religious liberty has become an issue about which the states now
have significant discretion. Thus, the remaining question is not so
much whether the states have an important role to play in defining
religious liberty, but how they will play the role that has been
thrust upon them. More specifically, will the states take advantage
of the Court's embrace of federalism by taking action that
advances the cause of religious liberty?
Advancing the cause of religious liberty may be easier said
than done. The meaning of religious liberty is unsettled and
deeply contested; there is no obvious "right answer" that, by
consensus, all the states should be encouraged to adopt. But
federalism presents a genuine advantage in this situation. In
particular, it provides an opportunity for the states to
experiment-to define religious liberty in new and creative ways-
whether through the interpretation of state constitutional law or
through legislative enactments.
Some states may wish to "restore," as a matter of state law,
the same legal doctrine that prevailed as a matter of federal law
prior to Smith and during the brief regime of RFRA prior to
Boerne. If so, their courts could adopt state constitutional
standards that follow the pre-Smith constitutional doctrine of the
Supreme Court. Alternatively, state legislatures could enact state-
law RFRAs tracking the substantive language of the federal
statute. It is far from clear, however, that either of these options is
13 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
14 See Conkle, supra note 8, at 79-90.
15 This is not to deny the possibility that Smith might eventually be overruled, nor that,
in the meantime, federal constitutional doctrine might be construed to protect religious
liberty in particular situations. See Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification
of Religious Liberty, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 565 (1999).
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the optimal approach. Indeed, there is evidence that the federal
RFRA, and the pre-Smith constitutional standard that it invoked,
were not particularly effective in protecting religious liberty. 16 The
time seems ripe for the consideration of other, more creative
responses. 7
So, what are the other options that states might consider? I
am not prepared to offer any definitive proposals, but I can
present, on a very tentative basis, a rough sketch of some of the
possibilities.
First, a state might enact legislation (or administrative
regulations) s creating specifically defined religious exemptions for
particular legal contexts. The need for particular exemptions
might be identified through the work of a legislative study
committee, or perhaps through the work of a special religious
liberty commission that might be established for this purpose.
Second, a state-either as a matter of state constitutional law
or as a matter of legislative enactment-might adopt a general
approach along the lines of the federal RFRA, but might provide a
more lenient standard of scrutiny in certain contexts, such as
prisons. 9
16 See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 575, 585-97
(1998) (discussing and explaining the legal impact of RFRA, including the results of
RFRA litigation); see also Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 TEX. L. REV. 247, 253-84 (1994) (explaining
the judicial resistance to free exercise claims and arguing that RFRA was destined to fail).
But cf. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 26, 26-27 (1997)
(statement of Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, U.S. Catholic Conference) (claiming
that "in fact, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, religion did far better than
many of us thought it would," in part because "RFRA served as an important tool in
negotiation, bargaining, and reaching compromise").
17 At the very least, states choosing to adopt legislation tracking the substantive
language of the federal RFRA should consider the inclusion of a "rule of construction,"
such as that contained in the current version of the proposed RLPA, stating that the
legislation should be given a broad construction in favor of the protection of religious
exercise. See H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 5(g) (1999).
18 The possibility of administrative action was suggested by Professor Jennifer Friesen
in her oral remarks during the symposium of which this article is a part.
19 Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had declined to apply its then-prevailing free
exercise standard of strict scrutiny to prison regulations, which it had instead evaluated
under a test of reasonableness. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-50
(1987). The federal RFRA repudiated O'Lone as well as Smith, extending strict scrutiny
to prisoner, as well as non-prisoner, claims. But as Professor Ira C. Lupu has suggested,
this sort of unitary standard can dilute the meaning of "strict scrutiny" in prisoner and
non-prisoner cases alike; as a result, Lupu argues that religious liberty legislation should at
least make prison cases "subject to an explicitly different standard than non-prison cases,
so that the results in the latter are not dragged down by the interpretations in the former."
Lupu, supra note 16, at 598. For competing views on the inclusion of prisoner claims in
RFRA-like legislation, compare Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, How the Grinch Stole Chanukah, 21
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Third, a state-either as a matter of state constitutional law or
as a matter of legislative enactment-might adopt a general
approach along the lines of the federal RFRA, but might attempt
to define more precisely what constitutes a prima facie claim for
relief. A state might attempt to define not only what counts as a
"substantial burden" on the exercise of religion,20 but also what
constitutes the "exercise of religion"-that is, the religious conduct
that is to be protected from such a burden.2
Fourth, a state-either as a matter of state constitutional law
or as a matter of legislative enactment-might adopt a general
approach along the lines of the federal RFRA, but might attempt
to define more precisely what sorts of governmental interests
qualify as "compelling" for this purpose and what sorts of legal
burdens might constitute the "least restrictive means" of
furthering such interests. The state might conclude, for example,
that in order for an interest to qualify as compelling, the
government must be acting to prevent or redress either direct
harms to identifiable third parties, or direct and substantial threats
to the public health, safety, or order.22
CARDOZO L. REV. 707 (1999), with David Schwarz, Religious Liberty Protection Act:
Impact on Religious Services in Prison, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999).
20 A "substantial burden" requirement, without more, invites interpretations leading
to the rejection of religious liberty claims. See Lupu, supra note 16, at 593-96.
21 The federal RFRA stated simply that "the term 'exercise of religion' means the
exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
2(4) (1994). In response to restrictive judicial interpretations of RFRA, the proposed
RLPA, as originally introduced in Congress, stated that "the term 'religious exercise'
means an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether
or not the act or refusal is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief."
H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. § 8(1) (1998); see also S. 2148, 105th Cong. § 8(1) (1998). This
definition was later reformulated in a manner that would not necessarily require that the
conduct even be "substantially motivated" by religion. Thus, under the current version of
the proposed legislation, "religious exercise" would mean "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief," and would
"include[] (A) the use, building, or conversion of real property by a person or entity
intending that property for religious exercise; and (B) any conduct protected as exercise of
religion under the first amendment to the Constitution." H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. § 8(1)
(1999). But this definition of "religious exercise" would not necessarily preclude
restrictive interpretations of the statute, because RLPA would continue to require,
without definition, that the claimant demonstrate that his or her religious exercise had
been "substantially burdened." See id. at § 2(a).
22 See Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 5, 31-35 (1994). See generally
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code,
56 MONT. L. REV. 249, 263-83 (1995) (discussing possible parameters of a strong
"compelling interest" requirement). As originally introduced, the proposed RLPA would
have moved in this direction with respect to land use regulations. It stated that
government could not impose a land use regulation that substantially burdened religious
exercise unless, at a minimum, the burden was "the least restrictive means to prevent
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Fifth, a state-either as a matter of state constitutional law or
as a matter of legislative enactment-might adopt a general
approach along the lines of the federal RFRA, but might provide
different standards of scrutiny for burdens imposed on different
sorts of religious exercise. For instance, the state might require
strict scrutiny for burdens imposed on "core" acts of religious
exercise, such as: religious worship or ritual; observance of dietary
obligations, Sabbath days, and religious holidays; and the wearing
of religious apparel, beards, or the like. At the same time, the
state might adopt a less vigorous standard, perhaps intermediate
scrutiny,23 for burdens imposed on other religiously motivated acts
of conscience, or perhaps for burdens imposed on any other acts of
conscience, whether religiously motivated or not.
24
These tentative suggestions raise difficult questions of
constitutionality, 25 policy, and practicability. As a matter of
institutional competence, it may be that only the first suggestion-
specifically crafted religious exemptions-is well suited to
definitive legislative resolution. Otherwise, the various options
that I have suggested may resist codification and may require case-
by-case development, 26 whether in accordance with a general
legislative mandate2 1 or, perhaps more effectively, as a matter of
substantial and tangible harm to neighboring properties or to the public health or safety."
H.R. 4019 § 3(b)(1)(A); see also S. 2148 § 3(b)(1)(A).
23 In its classic formulation, intermediate scrutiny would require that the burden on
religious exercise be "substantially related" to the achievement of an "important"
governmental interest. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (adopting an
intermediate test along these lines for gender-based classifications challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause).
24 See generally Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a
Statute with a Little "Conscience," 1996 BYU L. REV. 645 (proposing anti-discrimination
protection for religion and conscience alike).
25 In terms of federal constitutional law, the most significant limitation on a state's
protection of religious liberty is that of the Establishment Clause, although other
constitutional issues might also arise. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing, but only for himself, that the federal
RFRA not only exceeded the power of Congress under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also was a "law respecting an establishment of religion" in violation of
the Establishment Clause); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Establishment, Equal Protection and Free Speech Concerns, 56 MONT. L. REV. 227 (1995)
(discussing the Establishment Clause and other constitutional issues under the federal
RFRA). A state's protection of religious liberty could also raise questions under the
state's own constitution.
26 See generally Lupu, supra note 16, at 597-603 (arguing that religious liberty resists
codification).
27 For an explanation and defense of the generality of the federal RFRA, see Douglas
Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX.
L. REV. 209,217-21 (1994).
In a recent article, Professor Eugene Volokh argued that states should adopt
legislation implementing an even more general, "common-law" model for religious
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state constitutional law. 28
Whatever the difficulties, and whether they act by legislation
or by judicial action, the states should move forward to fill the
breach that has been created by Smith. In so doing, moreover,
they should not instinctively copy the RFRA model. Instead, they
should confront the risks and address the hard questions that other
alternatives might present. Now is the time for new thinking and
new directions.
In his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, James Madison wrote that "it is proper to take alarm
at the first experiment on our liberties. '29 I am not suggesting that
we should experiment on religious liberty, but I am contending
that the American experiment in religious liberty is in need of
renewal and redefinition, and that the states as laboratories-
whether through state constitutional law or through state
legislation-might play a valuable role in this process.
exemptions. See Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). Volokh's proposal would give courts broad discretion to
develop legal principles and create precedents relating to religious exemptions, but their
judicial decisions would be subject to legislative revision. See id. Under this sort of legal
regime, a state could implement-on a "common-law" basis-one or more of the
substantive approaches that I discuss in the text.
28 After Smith, there was some movement in the area of state constitutional law. See
Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging
Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275. The development of state
constitutional protection was cut short by RFRA. However, in the wake of Boerne, and in
the absence of new legislation, this development might productively begin afresh.
29 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 82 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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